| Thousands of Ford Explorer occupants have been | | | | involving 103 deaths and more than 400 injuries. |
| severely injured or killed in rollover accidents due to | | | | Many state agencies, such as law enforcement, |
| poorly designed Ford Explorers equipped with | | | | national park services and wildlife protection agencies, |
| defective Firestone tires. Ford Motor Company and | | | | use the Ford Explorer as their company vehicles. By |
| Bridgestone/Firestone covered-up knowledge of | | | | 1996, several state agencies began having major |
| deadly product defects for over ten years. | | | | problems with tread separations of Firestone tires on |
| A new law, the Transportation Recall Enhancement, | | | | Ford Explorers. |
| Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act, was | | | | On June 20, 1996, Lowell Whitaker, Arizona Game |
| passed in recognition of the manufacturers' failure to | | | | and Fish Department manager, sent a memo to his |
| divulge the deadly SUV/tire combination. Although | | | | regional supervisor describing two tire "blow out" of |
| both Ford and Firestone are to blame for the | | | | Firestone tires on Ford Explorers. Whitaker also |
| multitude of deaths, the root problems begin and end | | | | informs that the Department of Public Safety had |
| with Ford Motor Company. | | | | endured a series of collisions caused by tread |
| Thousands of people have suffered injury and death | | | | separations of Firestone tires (8). |
| due to the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire combination. | | | | The problem of tread separation was noticed much |
| According to an August 27, 2001 report, the federal | | | | earlier in other countries. By 1997, Ford dealers in the |
| government has linked 203 deaths and over 700 | | | | Middle East began to report similar tread separation |
| injured occupants, in the United States alone, to the | | | | problems on the Explorers. An internal Ford memo |
| poorly designed Ford Explorer and its defective | | | | from Carlos Mazzorin (Ford's group vice president, |
| Firestone tires (1). | | | | Asia Pacific Operations, South American Operations |
| The Icfai Center for Management Research | | | | and global purchasing) dated August 27, 1999 states: |
| estimates that the SUV/tire combination is | | | | "Issue description: While driving the vehicle at high |
| responsible for over 250 deaths and more than 3,000 | | | | speeds, for prolonged periods of time, the tire tread |
| injuries in the United States (2). | | | | separated (belt edge separation) from the main |
| According to the information collected by the National | | | | carcass of the tire. 19 rollovers attributed to this |
| Highway Traffic Association (NHTSA), approximately | | | | issue have occurred in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar |
| 85 percent of the deaths caused by the Ford | | | | combined. Several fatalities have resulted. The issue |
| Firestone defects occurred in the southern-most | | | | has also occurred in Venezuela, and fatalities have |
| regions of the United States. | | | | also resulted in that market." |
| The following are the number of deaths per state | | | | By 1999, Ford replaced Firestone tires on 46,912 of |
| caused by the SUV/tire combination according to an | | | | its SUVs in Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Ecuador, |
| April 2001 report by Public Citizen (3). | | | | Thailand, Malaysia and Colombia9. However, Ford and |
| - California: 28 fatalities | | | | Firestone failed to inform U.S. authorities and |
| - Nevada: 5 fatalities | | | | consumers of the problems. |
| - Arizona: 15 fatalities | | | | Ford Motor Company and Bridgestone/Firestone |
| - Montana: 1 fatality | | | | knew about the instability problems of Ford Explorers |
| - Colorado: 1 fatality | | | | and Firestone tire tread separations long before the |
| - New Mexico: 7 fatalities | | | | problems gained public attention. |
| - Nebraska: 1 fatality | | | | On February 7, 2000, Houston television station |
| - Oklahoma: 8 fatalities | | | | KHOU aired a report that spotlighted the tread |
| - Texas: 35 fatalities | | | | separation problems of Firestone tires on Ford |
| - Arkansas: 3 fatalities | | | | Explorers. The CBS affiliate station reported the |
| - Mississippi: 3 fatalities | | | | story of numerous deaths and lawsuits caused by |
| - Michigan: 1 fatality | | | | Firestone tread separations and Ford Explorer |
| - Massachusetts: 2 fatalities | | | | rollovers. The station's report prompted several |
| - New Jersey: 1 fatality | | | | dozen people in Texas to report similar problems to |
| - Maryland: 4 fatalities | | | | authorities. |
| - Pennsylvania: 1 fatality | | | | Almost immediately following the KHOU report, |
| - Ohio: 1 fatality | | | | NHTSA began studying the problem of Firestone tires |
| - Kentucky: 2 fatalities | | | | on Ford Explorers. On March 6, 2000, NHTSA began a |
| - Tennessee: 4 fatalities | | | | preliminary investigation after receiving dozens of |
| - Alabama: 3 fatalities | | | | inquiries and complaints. By May 2, 2000, the agency |
| - Georgia: 1 fatality | | | | launched a formal investigation into 47 million |
| - Florida: 28 fatalities | | | | Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness tires. NHTSA |
| Ford Motor Company approved the design of the | | | | found two major problems with Ford Motor |
| Firestone P235/75R15 ATX tire on June 11, 1987 (4). | | | | Company and Bridgestone/Firestone in their |
| It was specifically designed for use on the Ford | | | | investigation. |
| Explorer and was used as original equipment when | | | | The agency found that there was an unusually high |
| the vehicle was introduced in 1990. | | | | failure rate of Firestone tires on Ford Explorers and |
| Bridgestone/Firestone began mass-producing the | | | | that Ford and Firestone withheld pertinent information |
| 15-inch ATX tire in 1990. The tire was redesigned in | | | | from the public and from authorities regarding the |
| 1995 and 1996 when it was renamed the ATX II and | | | | deadly SUV/tire combination. |
| the Wilderness AT (5). | | | | Although Ford and Firestone began replacing |
| The Ford Explorer was first introduced in March of | | | | Firestone tires outside the United States as far back |
| 1990 as the successor of the Bronco II. The Bronco | | | | as 1998, the manufacturers did not conduct recalls in |
| II was known as being prone to rollover collisions; | | | | the U.S. until August 2000. NHTSA publicly announced |
| however Ford Motor Company designed the Explorer | | | | its investigation of 46 deaths related to the Ford |
| with the same frame and similar wheelbase-to-height | | | | Explorer/Firestone tire combination on August 7, |
| ratio as the Bronco II. | | | | 2000. |
| Ford knew that the Explorer would continue the | | | | A couple of days later, on August 9, 2000, |
| same rollover problems of the Bronco II; however it | | | | Bridgestone/Firestone announced a voluntary recall of |
| was much more cost effective to continue the | | | | 6.5 million 15" ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires. |
| production of the Explorer with the same rollover | | | | Almost a year later, in May 2001, Ford announced |
| prone frame and body style than to make any | | | | that it was recalling all 13 million Firestone Wilderness |
| changes. | | | | AT tires that remained on its vehicles. |
| The stability problems of the Ford Explorer were | | | | On November 1, 2000, NHTSA enacted the |
| known early and were well documented. Ford's own | | | | Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, |
| engineers recommended changes to the Explorer's | | | | and Documentation (TREAD) Act. The TREAD Act |
| design numerous times to counteract the vehicles | | | | was passed in recognition of Ford and Firestone's |
| propensity to rollover. The most important | | | | failure to divulge the deadly SUV/tire combination to |
| recommendations included: changes to the Explorer's | | | | United States authorities. |
| suspension, increasing its tract width, lowering its | | | | The new Act gives NHTSA authority to require |
| center of gravity and using smaller tires. The face of | | | | motor vehicle and vehicle equipment manufacturers |
| their own engineers, Ford did not make changes the | | | | to provide information about possible defects in the |
| design of the Explorer. Instead, Ford management | | | | United States or in foreign countries. The idea is to |
| decided to remove air from the tires, lowering the | | | | ensure that NHTSA receives appropriate data, |
| recommended pounds per square inch (psi) to 26. | | | | related to foreign recall actions and internal company |
| Firestone recommended a tire pressure of 30 psi, | | | | information on claims and lawsuits related to defects, |
| with a maximum 35 psi. | | | | in a timely fashion. |
| Despite the change in tire pressure, the Ford Explorer | | | | Although both Ford and Firestone are to blame, Ford |
| continued to be much more prone to rollovers than | | | | Motor Company is primarily responsible for the |
| other vehicles on the road. Leon Robertson, a retired | | | | multitude of deaths. Ford was behind most of the |
| Yale University epidemiologist, conducted a study on | | | | key decisions that resulted in such a dangerous SUV |
| vehicle occupant deaths in tire-related accidents using | | | | tire combination. The Ford Explorer is defectively |
| federal data from 1990 to 1997. | | | | designed. It has an inexcusably high rollover |
| According to this study, 91 percent of the Ford | | | | propensity that Ford Motor Company has known |
| Explorer occupants that died in tire-related accidents | | | | about since the vehicles introduction in 1990. The |
| involved rollovers. However, only 28 percent of | | | | tread problems of the Firestone tires were primarily |
| tire-related deaths in cars involved rollovers (6). | | | | due to the tires performance specifications |
| Ford's decision to deflate the tires increased the | | | | demanded by Ford. |
| Explorers rolling resistance (a positive consequence), | | | | The Ford Explorer is extremely rollover prone due to |
| however it also produced a lower fuel economy (a | | | | a high center of gravity and narrow wheelbase. In |
| negative consequence). In order to improve the | | | | order to counteract this deadly problem, Ford |
| Explorer's fuel economy without decreasing its rolling | | | | removed air from the tires to increase the Explorer's |
| resistance, Ford ordered Firestone to decrease the | | | | rolling resistance. However, the lower tire pressure |
| weight of the tires. In 1994, the tires' weight was | | | | resulted in a lower fuel economy. Then, in an attempt |
| reduced by about 10 percent. | | | | to improve fuel economy, Ford ordered that |
| According to Public Citizen, the weight decrease was | | | | Firestone lower the weight of the tires. However, |
| achieved by reducing the gauge of various internal | | | | the removal of weight resulted in a weaker and less |
| components, modifying the sub tread compound, | | | | durable tire making it more susceptible to tread |
| using a lightweight belt package, and making specific | | | | separations. |
| modifications to the sidewall of the tire (7). The | | | | The instability of the Ford Explorer and the tire tread |
| newly designed tire was lighter and subsequently less | | | | separation of Bridgestone/Firestone tires was known |
| durable, therefore making it more susceptible to | | | | within the automobile industry long before any recalls |
| tread separations. | | | | were ever carried out. Hundreds of injuries and |
| Tire-tread separations resulting in rollover collisions | | | | deaths have occurred due to the deadly SUV/tire |
| proved to be a problem almost immediately after the | | | | combination. |
| Ford Explorer was introduced in 1990. According to | | | | The design and subsequent re-design of the |
| Public Citizen, at least 5 lawsuits concerning the SUV | | | | Firestone tire was Ford's attempt to use a cost |
| tire combination were filed before 1993, and at least | | | | effective cosmetic remedy to fix a serious |
| 15 lawsuits were filed by the end of 1996. | | | | defectively designed vehicle. Ford chose to address |
| Consumers and dealers from the United States and | | | | the Explorer's stability problems by altering the tire |
| foreign countries filed thousands of complaints. By | | | | specifications instead of actually resolving the root |
| September 19, 2000, there were 2,200 complaints | | | | problem - the defective design of the Ford Explorer. |